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Payments for Environmental Services: Can They Work? 
The Case of Mexico
Helena García Romero
Researcher on environmental issues, Fedesarrollo
Abstract. Payments for Environmental Services (PES) Programs can be useful policy instruments for achiev-
ing conservation objectives through incentive mechanisms. However, the success of such programs depends 
on the particular solutions that are given to political economy constraints and challenges. The Mexican case 
provides helpful lessons on this topic, in addition to design and implementation insights.
The Mexican PES program has been in place since 2003. It strives to protect well-conserved forests and to 
have a social impact through payments made to the most marginalized communities. Nevertheless, its 
 impact in terms of avoided deforestation is not very high. This is due to targeting failures that arise from an 
internal trade-off between social and conservation goals. In order to align both objectives the continuous 
negotiation of goals and targeting mechanisms between the different stakeholders: government, bureaucra-
cy, non- government organizations (NGOs), and local communities must be kept in mind. Understanding and 
anticipating this policy process can ensure the desirable outcomes of PES programs in terms of poverty 
 alleviation and conservation.
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1 Introduction
The Payment for Environmental Services in Mexico (PSAH1) 
was created in 2003 as a response to high deforestation rates, 
a severe crisis of aquifer overexploitation, and high poverty 
rates in rural areas. Mexico is home to over 60 million hect-
ares of forests and tropical jungles distributed throughout the 
country2. However, between 1993 and 2000 crops and pas-
tures grew signiicantly at the expense of grasslands, forests 
and jungles, which were in danger of further deforestation. 
At the same time, the number of overexploited aquifers had 
been rising over time. In 1975, 36 aquifers were overexploit-
ed (out of 653), in 1985, 80 were overexploited, and by 2001 
the number was 97 (14.8%) (CNA, 2004). Finally, poverty 
rates in rural areas were higher than in urban areas. In 2000, 
42.4% of people living in rural areas suffered from extreme 
poverty (Coneval, 2010) and one-third of communities in the 
country had a very high level of marginality3. 
1 Programa de Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos.
2 National Forest Inventory, 2000.
3 The marginality index is composed of indicators for education, housing 
and public services, labor income, and size and remoteness of population.
Accordingly, the main objective of the PES Program has 
been to prevent deforestation in poor and marginalized areas 
of hydrological importance. The government and the owner 
of the forest sign a 5 year contract whereby the owner re-
ceives a payment at the end of each year if the forest is con-
served. The payment seeks to cover the opportunity cost for 
land owners of preserving the forest. The Program focuses 
on areas where commercial forestry is not feasible, since 
there are other government programs that support sustain-
able commercial exploitations.
The Program is operated by CONAFOR, the National 
Forestry Commission, and is inanced through revenues 
from water fees that are ear-marked and managed in a trust-
fund, Fondo Forestal Mexicano. This funding mechanism 
creates an indirect link between users and providers of the 
environmental service and also protects the program from 
time- inconsistency problems that could arise from political 
cycle issues or budgetary problems if the PES program were 
inanced through the general budget (Muñoz-Piña, Guevara, 
Torres and Braña, 2008).
Between 2003 and 2011 the PES Program has covered 
2.4 million hectares, and has disbursed 384.6 million USD4. 
The program has grown in size and budget substantially since 
its inception. In 2003 it enrolled 126 thousand hectares and 
4 All monetary igures are at constant 2011 prices.
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paid 19.5 million USD. In 2011, 330 thousand hectares were 
enrolled and 46.4 million USD were paid. Figure 1 shows 
this evolution over time. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear its impact has increased in line 
with the number of hectares and funds. Many of the forests 
enrolled in the program do not have a large deforestation risk, 
so with or without the payment, they would continue stand-
ing. The following sections will discuss the targeting issues 
the program faces, their probable causes, and lessons learned 
in order to improve Mexico´s program and provide insights 
for other PES programs.
2 Targeting
A PES Program’s eficiency and effectiveness depends cru-
cially on where the payments go. Even though all forests 
 provide environmental services and their owners should be 
compensated for them, with a binding budget constraint it is 
necessary to choose among plots to achieve maximum im-
pact. In this sense, if payments strive to change the owner’s 
decision between cutting down the trees and conserving the 
forest, we can think of 3 types of forest plots: there is a group 
of plots with very high opportunity cost of land-use change 
(group 1 in igure 2). For these, the PES payment will not be 
enough to avert deforestation. Other mechanisms, most likely 
regulatory, are needed if those forests are to be preserved. 
There is another group of forest plots whose opportunity cost 
of land use change is zero or negative (group 3). These plots 
will not be deforested, with or without the payment, since 
alternative activities on that land are not proitable. Finally, 
there is a group of plots whose opportunity cost is positive 
and smaller than the PES payment (group 2). This is the tar-
get population for the program. The challenge is being able to 
separate them from the others, particularly from group 3.
Figure 1. Enrolled surface and payments PSAH.
Figure 2. Types of plots in a PES program.
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In the case of Mexico, between 2003 and 2007 the Program 
successfully prevented 18 thousand hectares from being de-
forested. However, there were 1.8 million hectares enrolled 
in the program. This means that most plots belong to group 
3. This is the targeting failure of the Mexican PES program 
(Muñoz-Piña, Rivera, Cisneros and García, 2011).
The way to measure the impact of a PES program is to ask 
ourselves the question: what would have happened in ab-
sence of the program? Since we cannot observe this, we rely 
on the model of economic pressure for deforestation devel-
oped by Mexico’s National Ecology Institute (INE). This 
model uses satellite images of forests in the country taken at 
two moments in time, and uses the geographic and economic 
characteristics of each plot to explain differences between 
those two moments. Some of the variables used are altitude, 
slope, distance to roads, distance to towns, and price of corn, 
among others. Once we know the effect of these characteris-
tics on deforestation we can make predictions for plots that 
have forests. In this way it is possible to see whether the plots 
enrolled in the PES program would have been deforested or 
not in the absence of the program. 
To understand the reasons for the program’s small impact, 
we will now analyze the PES targeting mechanisms. The 
Program has 3 targeting mechanisms: deinition of elegibil-
ity zones, selection of plots, and differentiated payments. 
Elegibility zones and differentiated payments have been 
used since 2003. In terms of plot selection, there have been 
2 periods in the PES program. The irst period (2003-2005) 
was characterized by a irst-come-irst-served system. From 
2006 onwards, a point system with precedence criteria was 
set in place. Applications are then graded and sorted accord-
ing to their total points. Resources are allocated starting 
with the application with the most points until the budget 
runs out. 
If we take the criteria directly related to the program’s 
 initial objectives: water scarcity in the watershed, overex-
ploited aquifers, high or very high deforestation risk, and 
high and very high marginality, to see how targeting evolved 
during these two periods, we ind that there has been a slight 
improvement in terms of enrolled plots with high or very 
high marginality as well as high or very high deforestation 
risk. However, there is almost no change in terms of aquifer 
overexploitation or water scarcity (only 20 and 30 per cent of 
beneiciaries have these characteristics, respectively) as can 
be seen in igure 3. 
One could attribute the lack of more signiicant improve-
ments over time to self-selection, since the program is vol-
untary. That is, plots interested in the program are not on 
overexploited aquifers or have water scarcity. However, as 
we discuss in the following section, the main cause seem to 
be political economy constraints.
2.1 Elegibility zones
In order to limit the self-selection bias, the PES program de-
ines eligibility zones where the program will operate every 
year. Similar to the program’s budget and enrolled territory, 
the number of hectares included in eligibility zones has also 
increased dramatically over time (6-fold increase between 
2003 and 2010). The result is a large set of elegibility zones, 
where some meet primary criteria and some do not. 
Moreover, it is not clear what the standards are for includ-
ing new areas. If we compare the attributes of the eligibility 
zones in terms of hydrological importance, marginality or 
deforestation risk with the national average (igure 4), we see 
that the areas allowed to be in the program are, on average, 
more marginalized and have higher water scarcity than the 
national average. The opposite is true for deforestation risk 
Figure 3. Targeting results for the PES program.
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and with overexploited aquifers. Around 40 per cent of the 
country has a high or very high risk of being deforested. In 
eligibility zones the proportion is only 20 per cent. 
2.2 Plot selection
However, even if the set of elegibility zones is large, this 
can be solved through the mechanism to select individual 
 applicants. As mentioned before, the initial system was a 
irst-come-irst-served system that didn’t solve the above 
mentioned issues, nor selected applicants according to pri-
mary criteria. When the point system of precedence criteria 
was introduced in 2006, the idea was to be able to differenti-
ate between applicants with high hydrological value and de-
forestation risk from other, less relevant, plots, particularly 
between plots in groups 2 and 3. Nonetheless, since the irst 
year when the system was implemented the program opera-
tors have strived to generate complementarities with other 
government programs and to ease the administrative 
process by including secondary criteria in the precedence 
system. This has led to a reduction in the importance of pri-
mary criteria in the selection process relative to these other 
values over time.
As shown in igure 5, in 2006 there were 9 selection criteria 
that could give a maximum of 45 points. Primary criteria rep-
resented over 40 per cent of total points. In 2010 there were 
26 selection criteria that could give a total of 106 points. 
Primary criteria represented only 19 per cent of possible points.
Every year there are applicant plots that satisfy primary cri-
teria that are left out because other, not so good plots get 
more total points due to the secondary criteria. In this sense, 
the point precedence system is not being effective in choos-
ing the best plots in terms of conservation impact. 
An important issue is that the inclusion of these second-
ary criteria does not attract plots with those characteristics. 
So not only do they divert the focus of the program by se-
lecting plots with little or no hydrological importance and 
deforestation risk, but they are also ineffective in achieving 
complementarities between programs and facilitating the 
administrative process. 
2.3 Differentiated payments
A inal targeting mechanism in the program is the use of dif-
ferentiated payments. As discussed by Alix-Garcia, De Janvry, 
and Sadoulet (2008), calibrated payments can have an impor-
tant effect on the program’s eficiency. In Mexico, since 2003 
payments have been larger for certain ecosystems that  provide 
better hydrological environmental services (for example, 
cloud forests). In 2010, payments were further differentiated 
to account for deforestation risk. However, there is a trade-off 
between the ecosystems identiied with better environmental 
services and ecosystems with higher deforestation risk. For 
example, in 2010 there was not a single applicant from high 
deforestation risk cloud forest (highest possible payment). 
This is because very few hectares of cloud forest have this char-
acteristic. The cloud forests that remain are usually far away 
Figure 4. Eligibility zones and primary criteria.
Figure 5. Criteria in selection system.
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from roads and at high altitudes, so their deforestation risk is 
low. On the other hand, grasslands and tropical forests have a 
high deforestation risk, but receive low payments. Table 1 
shows the relation between payment and deforestation risk 
for different ecosystems.
As we have seen, the low impact of the PES program arises 
from problems in the diverse selection mechanisms used by 
the program. Some problems are technical issues and can be 
solved relatively easily, while others stem from a trade-off 
between social and conservation goals. These goals are em-
bodied in different groups that have a say in the program’s 
design and operation. This implies political economy issues 
that lie at the bottom of the targeting failure and low impact 
of the program.
3 Political economy constraints
There are two negotiation arenas that deine where and how 
the program will operate. These negotiations and the actors 
involved can explain to a large degree the targeting failure 
mentioned above and the dificulty in correcting it. In these 
negotiations the conceptual dificulty of deining value as a 
monetary concept or applying a broader perspective in terms 
of environmental services is well exempliied.
The irst negotiation arena has to do with the program’s bud-
get allocation. The payments for beneiciaries come from ear-
marked water fees that are stated in the Ley Federal de 
Derechos, and thus cannot be easily changed. However, the 
operational budget for the program comes from the general 
budget and must be negotiated and voted every year in Congress.
This has repercussions in the deinition of eligibility zones. 
Given the heterogeneous geographic and environmental 
conditions in the country, it is dificult to set national selec-
tion standards. For example, in the southeast there is very 
high deforestation risk but very low water scarcity. 
Conversely, in the north there is very high water scarcity and 
low deforestation risk. This is a technical issue that could 
potentially be solved by setting regional standards. However 
this is not feasible, because if any particular rule is perceived 
to beneit one state over another, the annual budget negotia-
tion could be compromised.
Given this constraint, we must live in a second best world 
where some irrelevant areas are included in eligibility zones. 
As long as the relevant areas in terms of primary criteria are 
included, this targeting failure could be corrected at later 
 selection stages.
This irst negotiation arena, between states and the central 
government (through CONAFOR, the program operator) is 
basically a struggle for resources and budgetary allocation. It 
can be countered to some extent through local PES programs, 
where the state or watershed authority deines eligibility 
zones in its particular territory and does not have to negotiate 
with 31 other players (the number of states in Mexico).
The second negotiation arena is within the program’s tech-
nical committee. This second arena is more complex, and it 
exempliies the problem of deining value within a PES 
Program. The technical committee was instituted in 2003 
along with the program in order to generate enough political 
support to get inancing. It is made up of government repre-
sentatives, NGOs, academics, and is open to anyone who 
wishes to participate. The committee makes recommenda-
tions to CONAFOR who chooses whether to implement them 
or not. It meets 4 times a year and discusses Program results 
and future operation rules.
One of the main issues within the committee are the differ-
ences in the overall vision and understanding of the Program. 
The members of the technical committee can be grouped 
roughly into two camps. One camp believes the program’s 
objective is conservation by compensating those who have 
made conservation efforts in the past, regardless of their cur-
rent deforestation risk and/or hydrological importance. Their 
conception of environmental value goes beyond a utilitarian 
view of services provided by the forest. The other camp 
 believes the program’s objective is conservation by compen-
sating forest owners for the opportunity cost of land-use 
change they currently face. This second camp recognizes the 
Table 1. Differentiated payments and deforestation risk.
Type of forest
Deforestation risk
Very low Low Medium High Very high
Pine forest 30% 30% 25% 14% 2%
Pine-oak forest 26% 24% 23% 19% 8%
Oak forest and others 24% 20% 21% 22% 13%
Cloud forest 46% 29% 21% 4% 0%
Low tropical dry forest 10% 10% 17% 37% 27%
Tropical dry forest 5% 6% 11% 60% 18%
Subtropical moist  
broadleaf forest
7% 10% 15% 27% 41%
P
a
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importance of past conservation efforts, but believes that in 
order to make the program effective, one must choose among 
plots and set clear indicators to measure effectiveness. Their 
conception of value is limited to services one can measure 
and pay for.
From this fundamental discrepancy about who should be 
included in the program and why, stem differences in terms of 
precedence criteria and eligibility zones to be included as well 
as on how to design differentiated payments. This can be seen 
in the changes in the program’s operation rules, where year 
after year the program’s selection criteria have changed. Every 
year a compromise is reached between the 2 groups so that 
the program con function within the opeational constraints 
CONAFOR faces. This explains why even though it’s clear 
the program is not being as effective as it could be, no decisive 
actions have been taken to solve the existing problems.
4 Conclusions and recommendations
Payment for Environmental Services Programs can be effec-
tive forest conservation tools insofar as they effectively avoid 
deforestation. In the case of Mexico, even though the PES 
program has grown in budget and area over the 8 years it has 
been in place, its impact on deforestation has not increased as 
much. Many of the forest plots that participate in the Program 
would not have been cut down even without a payment. This 
is due to targeting failures that stem from internal differences 
in perspectives of what the program’s objective should be. 
The way these conceptual differences on what value means 
are conciled leads to targeting failures and low impact levels 
in terms of avoided deforestation.
In the case of Mexico there are some small changes that could 
improve the Program’s targeting and effectiveness. First of all, 
it is necessary to deine elegibility zones in a more transparent 
way and according to primary criteria. Second, more promotion 
should be made for the PES Program in  hydrologically impor-
tant areas where then umber of applicants is low. This could 
helps reduce the self selection bias by actively encouraging 
 forest owners in critical areas to participate.
Third, when it comes to choosing which plots will partici-
pate in the Program it is important to redeine the selection 
criteria and the points given to each, so that primary criteria 
carry greater weight in the process and all relevant plots are 
included. Finally, with respect to differentiated payments, a 
more thorough analysis of what the opportunity cost for 
 different ecosystems is and the deforestation risk they face 
is needed to offer adequate and eficient payments.
These changes are especially relevant as the Program 
grows and more resources, coming from REDD+ or other 
funds, are invested in it.
The challenges faced by the Mexican PES program are not 
unique. All PES programs will be subject to some degree of 
political pressure from different groups and all agencies will 
face operational challenges, as well as differences in the basic 
conception of the PES program. Learning to deal with these 
issues and negotiate clear evaluation criteria is a priority in 
 order to use scarce public resources eficiently and effectively. 
Abbreviations
CONAFOR National Forestry Commission
INE National Ecology Institute
PES Payment for Environmental Services
PSAH Payment for Hydrological  
 Environmental Services
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